You're wrong about New York being pro-employee. California is the king of employee rights and New York is one of the worst jurisdictions for employee rights. Employees essentially have no rights in New York. New York is a true "at-will" jurisdiction.

I predict his case will be dismissed on summary judgment. If not it will be laughed at by a hardened NY jury. New Yorkers dealing with the city, and struggling paycheck to paycheck, won't sympathise with Mr. Charney. If he wins a jury trial, the damages will be no more than $50k or so.

As evidence I point you to the fact that no plaintiff's lawyer was willing to touch it.

If you don't believe me talk to an employment discrimination lawyer in New York.

Respectfully, I am an employment discrimination attorney and you may want to familiarize yourself with NYC's statute. Employee at will makes it difficult, but cases can and will be one. I'll predict the case settles well before summary judgment, and even well before depositions of the major players. I don't know the reason why he is pro se, and I'm curious who his prior attorney was, but read the complaint, know the law, and you'll change your opnion quickly. Liability exists (damages are another issue).

What do you predict it settles for? I'm guessing $100k absolute max.

As a disc. attorney, would you invest your time and money by taking his case on contingency?

As a discrimination defense lawyer, I can say that there are plenty of plaintiff side employment lawyers who bring suits against NYC biglaw firms and some are quite good and respectable. Unless Charney made no friends in law school or at S&C, there is no way he could not have found out who those people are and shopped his case around to them.

I can also say that there are assertions in the complaint that are provably untrue, which should kill Charney's credibility. I do not, and never did, work at S&C.

I won't guess as to a settlement amount because I only know one side of the story; S&C's response thus far is not a court filing, which may differ from their public statement.

What are the provably untrue allegations?

Note Anonymous didn't answer my second question. Speaks volumes re: the merits of the case.

I didn't ignore the 2nd question, just missed it when distracted by a work call.

I rarely take contingency cases, so it is not a fair question to me, and in any event I'd need to speak with the client re: his goals. I suspect there was an offer on the table before he filed, and if prior counsel was contingency, there would be a lien on the file that would restrict Charney's ability to obtain new counsel (also on a contingency). Given Charney's public statements about making an issue/statement, this would be a problem as attorneys on contingency are interested in 1/3 of a cash settlement and not 1/3 of solving bias generally. As I've said previously, the allegations show merit and will be sufficient (easily) to survive the motion to dismiss (even without the recent barring him from the office as an added retaliation claim; retaliation is MUCH easier to win than the underlying discrimination case).

If you "do not, and never did, work at S&C," how do you know that "there are assertions in the complaint that are provably untrue"? I ask this not at all accusatorily, but with legitimate curiosity regarding the basis of your knowledge.

"I rarely take contingency cases" also speaks volumes.

I wonder if the plaintiff engaged in an ethical violation by including the interoffice emails that included client information. While it is not particularly exciting information, nevertheless, those may include client confidences that he may not reveal without the client's consent.

I've been doing plaintiff's discrimination litigation (on a contingency, too) for many of the past 10 years, and have developed a good instinct about cases.

This one's probably a 2.7 on a scale of 1 to 10, and barely passes the "yeah, and get over it" threshhold.

Random comments: (a) it will obviously survive a motion to dismiss, and probably a sj motion (although just by the skin of its metaphysical teeth); (b) Charney SHOULDN'T have "outed" his allies at S&C; this really calls his judgment into serious question (he'll never get any more information from them, and if those allies aren't not bitter & resentful, they're better people than I); (c) low, low damages from a not-terribly-sympathetic plaintiff... ; (d) so he had a personality dispute with Krautheimer. So what?

I'd take it simply to *bleep* with S&C (I had a bad interview w/them in law school), but nothing more.

Doesn't it sound like S&C (which is big enough to have a PR firm at its fingertips) is doing everything possible to get this off course and look for ways to attack beyind what the guy siad happened to him there?

Doesn't it seem like the firm (which is big and powerful and rich enough to have a PR firm at its fingertips) is doing everything possible to get this off course and direct attention to other stuff than what the guy is saying they did to him?

ooops. sorry about the double post folks^^. Didn't know it made it in the 1st time. :)

And the "Anonymous" poster from 228pm. 232pm and 234pm is a different "Anonymous" from the earlier posts.

I agree that damages can be a problem, depending on the extent of his psych injuries (as mentioned in the complaint).

David, how much is Charney's salary and bonus (I figure you have all that info easily at your fingertips since it is so close to bonus season)? At $100k (as guessed above), that is in the range of less than 6 months of severance, which seems light.

I've read the complaint, and I can't figure out what everybody's drinking.

So a couple of partners made comments that Charney thinks were off-color. If true, the quotes are certainly foul, but it sounds like he-said-he-said. Just about everything else in the complaint is second-hand gossip from other S&C associates. Charney assumes that every rumor about bad behavior by the partners is true (because office rumor mills are so notoriously accurate). But when he hears untrue gossip about his own relationships, he interprets it as an intentional smear campaign.

He's told to stop hanging out with his buddy all the time, and he interprets it as a veiled homophobic attack--isn't it possible that they're just acting like a couple of chortling schoolboys and they're being told to act more professionally? He's left off of the mentoring list and he interprets it as indicating that he's been black-balled. Most lawyers I know view mentoring as a serious time-suck that they'd rather avoid, but he has worked himself into such a state that he interprets a fortuitous clerical error as a death sentence.

I just don't get it. A couple of people may or may not have said mean things to him. He hears rumors that they're upset when he complains. He hears rumors from other associates that partners want to harm his career, but nobody ever does anything. Much of the "hard" evidence of discrimination sounds like the product of his fevered imagination: he is gay and his male friend is his constant companion, but any gossip about them must be maliciously planted by the offending partners; a gay partner reaches out to him after he complains, and this is an effort by S&C to insulate itself from the charges rather than a well-intentioned gesture by an individual; the partnership agreement doesn't specifically identify discrimination (or genocide, or terrorism, or much of anything else) as grounds for termination, so that proves the firm tolerates such behavior. Please.

Look, I know it's perfectly plausible that there could be some bigoted creeps working at S&C or anyplace else. But how, exactly, did the firm discriminate against him? Where is the injury to his career? The brief is well-written, but all I see is a well-written transcript of office gossip.

This kid is not looking for publicity. He's not an idiot, even if he is crazy as some people say. He must know that this could end his legal career. The legal world is not like Hollywood. Lawyers and their clients worry about image. Paris Hilton may have gotten famous because of a sex tape, but a corporate lawyer's career would be snuffed out by any such controversy. I think the fact that he did this, even with all the attendant risk, shows that he's not in it for publicity. Also, he wouldn't be in this for the money. He's clearly not the type of person who wants to lounge around and just be handed dollar bills. He's a hard worker (phi beta kappa and magna cum laude at Brown; Columbia Law School; S&C's notoriously demanding M&A group). He doesn't seem the type who would be happy leading a reclusive life where all of his past accomplishments are useless to him even with all the money in the world. Just my two cents.

I used to work at S&C. Nothing in this complaint, except the fact that someone had the guts to file it (especially this guy, who was the most rah rah about the place), shocks me. The people he names in the complaint have terrible reputations for being "difficult."

His salary for last year was $170,000 base + $45,000 bonus.

To opine, you need to know the applicable statute and caselaw. This is Burlington Northern v. White (Supreme Court, June 22, 2006), which interprets a much narrower federal statute.

As I noted earlier, the NYC law is more expansive than its federal counterpart and Charney filed ONLY under the NYC statute. He may be stuck in state court, but he made a smart move.

Below is all from Burlington Northern:
An employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace. See, e.g., Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d, at 1213 (FBI retaliation against employee “took the form of the FBI’s refusal, contrary to policy, to investigate death threats a federal prisoner made against [the agent] and his wife”); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F. 3d 980, 984, 986 (CA10 1996) (finding actionable retaliation where employer filed false criminal charges against former employee who complained about discrimination). A provision limited to employment-related actions would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take. Hence, such a limited construction would fail to fully achieve the anti-retaliation provision’s “primary purpose,” namely, “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 346 (1997) .
(snip)
The scope of the anti-retaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm. We therefore reject the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals that have treated the anti-retaliation provision as forbidding the same conduct prohibited by the anti-discrimination provision and that have limited actionable retaliation to so-called “ultimate employment decisions.”
(snip)
The anti-retaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm. As we have explained, the Courts of Appeals have used differing language to describe the level of seriousness to which this harm must rise before it becomes actionable retaliation. We agree with the formulation set forth by the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits. In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, “which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” Rochon, 438 F. 3d, at 1219 (quoting Washington, 420 F. 3d, at 662).
We speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does not set forth “a general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998) ; see Faragher, 524 U. S., at 788 (judicial standards for sexual harassment must “filter out complaints attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing’ ”). An employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience. See 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 669 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that “courts have held that personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy” and “ ‘snubbing’ by supervisors and co-workers” are not actionable under §704(a)). The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference with “unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms. Robinson, 519 U. S., at 346. It does so by prohibiting employer actions that are likely “to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,” the courts, and their employers. Ibid. And normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not create such deterrence. See 2 EEOC 1998 Manual §8, p. 8–13.
We refer to reactions of a reasonable employee because we believe that the provision’s standard for judging harm must be objective. An objective standard is judicially administrable. It avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings. We have emphasized the need for objective standards in other Title VII contexts, and those same concerns animate our decision here. See, e.g., Suders, 542 U. S., at 141 (constructive discharge doctrine); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (hostile work environment doctrine).
We phrase the standard in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context matters. “The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.” Oncale, supra, at 81–82. A schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may make little difference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with school age children. Cf., e.g., Washington, supra, at 662 (finding flex-time schedule critical to employee with disabled child). A supervisor’s refusal to invite an employee to lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight. But to retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination. See 2 EEOC 1998 Manual §8, p. 8–14. Hence, a legal standard that speaks in general terms rather than specific prohibited acts is preferable, for an “act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others.” Washington, supra, at 661.
Finally, we note that contrary to the claim of the concurrence, this standard does not require a reviewing court or jury to consider “the nature of the discrimination that led to the filing of the charge.” Post, at 6 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Rather, the standard is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not the underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII complaint. By focusing on the materiality of the challenged action and the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, we believe this standard will screen out trivial conduct while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to dissuade employees from complaining or assisting in complaints about discrimination.
(snip)
First, Burlington argues that a reassignment of duties cannot constitute retaliatory discrimination where, as here, both the former and present duties fall within the same job description. Brief for Petitioner 24–25. We do not see why that is so. Almost every job category involves some responsibilities and duties that are less desirable than others. Common sense suggests that one good way to discourage an employee such as White from bringing discrimination charges would be to insist that she spend more time performing the more arduous duties and less time performing those that are easier or more agreeable. That is presumably why the EEOC has consistently found “[r]etaliatory work assignments” to be a classic and “widely recognized” example of “forbidden retaliation.” 2 EEOC 1991 Manual §614.7, pp. 614–31 to 614–32; see also 1972 Reference Manual §495.2 (noting Commission decision involving an employer’s ordering an employee “to do an unpleasant work assignment in retaliation” for filing racial discrimination complaint); EEOC Dec. No. 74–77, 1974 WL 3847, *4 (Jan. 18, 1974) (“Employers have been enjoined” under Title VII “from imposing unpleasant work assignments upon an employee for filing charges”).
To be sure, reassignment of job duties is not automatically actionable. Whether a particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and “should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the circumstances.’ ” Oncale, 523 U. S., at 81. But here, the jury had before it considerable evidence that the track labor duties were “by all accounts more arduous and dirtier”; that the “forklift operator position required more qualifications, which is an indication of prestige”; and that “the forklift operator position was objectively considered a better job and the male employees resented White for occupying it.” 364 F. 3d, at 803 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on this record, a jury could reasonably conclude that the reassignment of responsibilities would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee.
(snip)
Neither do we find convincing any claim of insufficient evidence. White did receive backpay. But White and her family had to live for 37 days without income. They did not know during that time whether or when White could return to work. Many reasonable employees would find a month without a paycheck to be a serious hardship. And White described to the jury the physical and emotional hardship that 37 days of having “no income, no money” in fact caused. 1 Tr. 154 (“That was the worst Christmas I had out of my life. No income, no money, and that made all of us feel bad. … I got very depressed”). Indeed, she obtained medical treatment for her emotional distress. A reasonable employee facing the choice between retaining her job (and paycheck) and filing a discrimination complaint might well choose the former. That is to say, an indefinite suspension without pay could well act as a deterrent, even if the suspended employee eventually received backpay. Cf. Mitchell, 361 U. S., at 292 (“[I]t needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions”). Thus, the jury’s conclusion that the 37-day suspension without pay was materially adverse was a reasonable one.

All we really need to know is that you wouldn't touch it on contingency with a ten foot pole.