Associate Bonus Watch: Does the 'Herd Mentality' Make Sense?
That's the question Andrew Ross Sorkin, the young star business reporter of the New York Times, tackles in his latest DealBook column. After describing the recent wave of bonus announcements, which fell into the typical pattern -- one firm led, and everyone else mechanically followed, "as if [they] had simply copied and pasted the numbers directly from Cravath’s memo" -- Ross Sorkin writes:
Lawyers are smart, but this herd mentality seems absolutely irrational, economically speaking — and not because the compensation is too high. The top law firms have been stuck in copycat mode for years. As soon as one of them raises salaries for associates, the others fall in line almost immediately.At first glance, it makes sense in a free-market kind of way that law firms rush to match one another’s compensation packages. They have to compete for talent, especially for the annual crop of law school graduates. Indeed, if they never raised salaries or bonuses, they would probably be accused of conspiring to keep costs down.
But think about this for a moment: Is there any other business in which every competitor matches salaries and bonuses almost identically?
Good question. Nothing really comes to mind (with the exception of "highly unionized industries," already noted in the article).
More excerpts and discussion, after the jump.
Large law firms' lemming-like approach to associate compensation may look odd to outsiders. But Ross Sorkin correctly recognizes its roots within the legal profession's culture:
The root of the problem may lie in the top law firms’ oddly egalitarian tradition of paying the same amount to associates at the same level. Many refer to it internally as “lockstep.” At some firms, that applies to partners, too, though that is becoming increasingly rare. And to be fair, some firms, though not necessarily the top tier, like Schulte Roth & Zabel, give bonuses based on billable hours, which critics say has the potential to encourage “bill padding” — a euphemism for fraud — or at the very least, a white-collar sweatshop.Equal pay advocates say it fosters teamwork and prevents resentment....
A lockstep system has other advantages, too. At least at the associate level, the cost of a system that would make accurate, individualized assessments of associate performance, to be used for setting compensation, may not be worth the cost, administrative hassle, and increase in office politics. Look at all the trouble Howrey is having in rolling out its new, merit-based approach to pay.
That's not to say that it can't be done, however. Kirkland & Ellis is one of the country's biggest law firms, but it somehow manages to individualize associate bonuses.
Back to the column:
But [the lockstep approach] also does something else: It makes it so easy to compare compensation across firms that it becomes glaringly obvious when one firm is out of sync. In the rest of the world, employers often pay a range of salaries and bonuses for the same job, and no one is sure what the guy or gal in the next office is making, never mind the people at a rival firm.
True, lockstep does make it "glaringly obvious when one firm is out of sync." And ATL is here to make it super-glaringly obvious! Please keep sending us your bonus announcements.
Which brings us back to the original question: Why do a dozen elite law firms all match the bonuses for associates? More specifically, why would one firm raise its bonus, knowing that its rivals will immediately match it? What competitive advantage is created for the firm that goes first, beyond a brief morale boost among the troops and perhaps bragging rights for five minutes?It calls to mind the masochistic “fare wars” among airlines, which often cut prices on competitive routes, forcing others to follow. But unlike an airline, a law firm has little hope of squeezing a competitor out of business — or in legal-speak, moving it “down from the first tier to the second tier.”
That's largely, but not entirely, true. This one-two punch -- raising starting salaries to $160,000, led by Simpson, and paying out large "special" bonuses, led by Cravath -- has forced many non-New York firms (and even some New York ones) to admit, after years of trying to pretend to the contrary, that they don't play with the big boys.
Here is Ross Sorkin's conclusion:
Evan R. Chesler, Cravath’s presiding partner, told The New York Times last month that the firm had originally wanted to “thank our lawyers for the hard work this year and the good year we’ve had.”It’s a nice thought but somewhat specious. Partners at law firms are a notoriously greedy bunch — that’s why they accept so few new partners — making it hard to believe that they are willing to part with their money so easily. I suggest there is something else at play: Law firms match bonuses to secure bragging rights.
Within their risk-averse, insular world, it’s a way of saying, “We’re in the top tier.” But it doesn’t necessarily make good business sense. Though partners at elite firms routinely pocket millions, law firms have never been run as efficiently as truly great companies. After all, they’re run by lawyers.
In general, we agree with Ross Sorkin that a rigidly lockstep system doesn't make the greatest economic sense, at least from the law firms' point of view. Our prediction is that, as associate salaries (and partner profits) continue to rise, there will be more segmentation and differentiation within the profession -- both among firms and among associates at the same firm.
With respect to firms, as some practice areas grow even more profitable, while others languish, firms that excel in the most lucrative specialties will rise even higher into the stratosphere. The difference between the most profitable Am Law 100 firms and the rest of the pack, which has been growing larger in recent years, will continue to expand.
With respect to associates, as lawyer talent gets more expensive, the cost of a system that separates the all-stars from the also-rans grows smaller relative to the amount of money on the table. More firms may move in the direction of Howrey, and set salaries based on the individual associate's talent, or at least Kirkland, and pay a wide range of bonuses to reward the top performers. Also, bonuses for Supreme Court clerks, already at $250,000, will continue to grow at a faster rate than other forms of associate compensation.
But that's just our speculation. What do you think? The comments are wide open.
P.S. These are just excerpts from the DealBook column. Read the complete column, which is well worth your time, over here.
Lawyers Compete, Except in Bonuses [New York Times]

first mentality!
I think the whole "herd mentality" of lockstep is ridiculous, and ultimately, hurts associates. It demeans the whole industry in the eyes of all participants, including clients and judges. There. I said it.
To add to that point, I don't think the "herd mentality" is necessary either. I won't argue that it's demeaning to anyone, but the highest paying firms can only hire but so many associates. In fact, "so many" is actually "a very small number." There are far many more highly talented associates. Sure, you don't want to offer LESS than the entire market, but there's no need to jump to the highest salary just because some one or two other firms did. You'll get the top students because, well, Cravath and Skadden can't hire them all!!
This article was written as poorly as the strained freshman essays I used to grade as grad student. Unfortunately, it was also shot through with the economist perspective permeating law schools recently. In short, law firms raise because they hope to stratify the market and, as is evident in this current round, it works. Once you hand the snot-nosed first years a bucket of cash, the bucket better be bigger down the line. In fact, deeper in the class it has to be much bigger (or so firms think) to hold the very valuable mid to senior associates.
Just a side note on why Debevoise announced so quickly. Word is that the partners at Debevoise were on the verge of announcing a special bonus anyway. Both the litigation and corporate departments had banner years and the partnership was going to award special bonuses to reward (keep) associates. Some partners were quite frustrated when Cravath beat them to the punch...they were hoping to be market leaders this time.
Congrats Lat, you beat the WSJ blog in posting this by 13 minutes.
Why is this guy bad mouthing Schulte? I don't think they work any harder than the more "prestigious" firms and they actually were rewarded for that hard work.
9:05 - for a person with a graduate degree, who used to grade "poorly" written freshman essays, I wassurprisedto notice an error in your post.
"...I used to grade as [a] grad student."
Two things.
Sorkin is right. lawyers are generally poor business people. It makes little economic sense in today’s market.
a.banker makes an important point. Lawyers don’t and generally can’t switch jobs as easily as bankers. Conflicts issues.
The lockstep payment scheme makes sense when the firm doesn’t do lateral hiring. if no lateral hiring, then that means the main recruiting signal they can use for future partners is telling those law students how much bonus they will get their first year.
He's not making fun of Schulte, just recognizing that it's not as well respected as the top tier firms. It's a fact of life, not a value judgment.
It is too early for this kind of self-righteous indignation, as if you didn't know Schulte's not in the same ballgame as S&C, DPW, Simpson, Cleary, etc.
9:23(1),
You need to get a life.
Guys in my highschool used to raise salaries with a "herd mentality" all the time, it was no big deal.
Aren't we just talking about New York though? Even tier 1 firms aren't tier 1 across the board.
@ 9:23: You can't seriously be arguing that lawyers are so dumb at business that the free market won't work for them, and other industries, say trash pickers on the streets of India, are somehow smart enough?
you need to get a life YOU
what about schulte?!
Indeed, "Not the person you dissed."
And thank you. because i wassurprised to see capitalization mistakes and runonwords in a post to a bulletin board harping on the omission of word.
Why is a tight compensation range across an incredibly narrow band of a very large industry at all interesting?
Wouldn't it make sense for one firm to go over-the-top after a bonus announcement or base salary hike? If Cravath pays out special bonuses, then a few weeks later DPW matches special bonuses and raises base salary, wouldn't that have the effect of discouraging first raisers?
The only solution: an OPEC-style cartel of first-tier firms that regulate lawyer wages. But then the U.S. would need to start amassing strategic lawyer reserves.... well we need some place to send TTT grads.
Cravath and Skadden can't hire them all, but firms with better quality of life (and lower pay) can hire a good number of them. I would accept a lower pay for better QOL. If I know I am getting paid the same amount as someone who is working less hours, then that is it, I am gone. I will quit law altogether and go fulfill my personal dream of being a baker.
One quote from the article missing in this post:
"It also has very little to do with recruiting. Bonuses are for people who already have jobs. It is somewhat understandable if top-tier firms match first-year associates’ salaries so they can attract the very best students, but once they are employed, it makes less sense. Most people who switch firms at that tier do so because they think have a better chance of making partner somewhere else, or for lifestyle reasons."
I think this shows just how little the author understands the legal recruiting market.
Ross Sorkin is (almost) entirely WRONG. It's true that lawyers, even the sharpest partners at the top firms, are not the best business people (for the educational and bar demands, then the grinding hours, lawyers don’t make much money), insofar as they have not maximized their own earning potential. But Ross Sorkin’s claim that lockstep pay makes bad economic sense is way off.
Paying lockstep salaries and bonuses is simply the CHEAPEST way to pay associates. The current market salaries and bonuses represent the basement floor for compensation - and the partners know that each fall the top 2L’s at the top tier schools will do their very best to secure a spot in those prestigious basements, from which very few will ever rise to the main floor of the house.
It’s the rare biglaw junior associate who isn’t turning at least a modest profit for the firm. Mid-level and senior associates put hundreds of thousands of dollars in the pockets of partners.
Should more firms opt for the Kirkland & Ellis “eat what you kill” model, which generally lands associates double the “market” bonus? THAT would make economic sense, under Ross Sorkin’s analysis. But it would mean less money for partners (not that K & E partners are starving), and perhaps higher bills for clients.
One would think that a guy who grew up rich in NY on the toil of associates (his father being a partner at CG) would have a better sense of the economic advantages (for partners and clients) of the lock-step system.
When this guy talks about economics, he completely misses the issue of branding. If you want to be thought of as a second rate law firm, pay below market salary.
as an alternative view to 10:23.
Assuming that not paying lockstep somehow reduces associate salaries (even though 10:23's posts makes a good point that it is unlikely), what will that mean for the profession as a whole?
One of the major driving forces of people going into law is that magic number that is the associate salary. If that number no longer looks solid because firms move all over the place with the salaries, the number of people entering law school will drop as will the pool of candidates for firms to choose from. Best and brightest usually go to where they'll be compensated, or feel fulfilled. Since law isn't medicine or science, very few find it fulfilling, which leaves compensation as the only way to attract talent. You start messing with the salaries, and people who are risk averse will NOT become lawyers. Imagine if going to a top law school no longer automatically means 160? Not everyone from those schools ends up at Wachtell, Sullivan, Cravath, a lot end up Vault 50-100 firms, and even lower.
Andrew Ross Sorkin hits the nail on the head. These law firms appear economically disfunctional, especially when ALL associates from a given class year are given the same salary and same bonus. What really is the justification for such a lock-step system? Clearly not all associates are worth the same amount. It's a wonder why their pay does not reflect this, however.
I really think law firms are just too busy/afraid to try to put a price on each of their associates. And so, as in many other respects, the firms just continue with the same system that has long been in place, regardless of the foolish economics that underlie it.
I suspect a more value-based system will come into play in the near future, though I'm not sure firms will really embrace it. Sort of strange, since law is about the only profession that still does not link salary to performance. Not a very sensible system to promote high quality work.
But then again, law firms don't bill by the quality of the work. They just bill by the hour.
"Sorkin is right. lawyers are generally poor business people. It makes little economic sense in today’s market."
So why have most large law firms managed to survive in one form or another and remain profitable substantially longer than most other businesses of similar size?
It's somewhat ironic that Sorkin criticizes law firm management on the premise that lawyers are not properly trained to run businesses given that he writes articles, such as this one, about business economics when he has little training in that field. Yes, he posits what might be a plausible hyphothesis about the economic sensibility of lockstep pay; but there are many plausible counterhypotheses, as evidenced by the comments on this forum.
Bottom line, Sorkin doesn't have the training, expertise, information, or empirical analysis to be able to give anything more than a very weak, off-the-cuff conclusion about the economics of law firms.
It's interesting how so many of you seem to distinguish among firms based only on whether they pay the highest associate salary or not.
But if law is truly a client-centric profession, why is your yardstick for success based so heavily on associate compensation? I've never once heard firms boast about the results they achieve for their clients in the same way they gloat over their compensation structure.
Accounting firms, most likely the closest thing to law firms in structure, are nearly lock step among the industry for the first couple of years. They systems are more performance review based so within a firm consultants of the same year would make different money but across firms it was nearly identical holding year and level of progress constant.
"I really think law firms are just too busy/afraid to try to put a price on each of their associates. And so, as in many other respects, the firms just continue with the same system that has long been in place, regardless of the foolish economics that underlie it."
good point. also: who's going to undertake the administrative task of assinging a value ot each associate? the only ones who are capable of making such judgments are partners (it's not as if th HR folks have any idea), and what partner wants to spend MORE time on admin tasks rather than on revenue-generation?
lockstep compensation is quick and easy. unlike other businesses, time spent on law firm admin tasks detract from revenue generation, b/c many of the same people have to do both...the revenue generators are the managers as well, which is different from most other businesses.
so it's likely cheaper in the end to simply pay lockstep salaries than to undertake a time-consuming valuation process that may or may not result in lower average salaries.
Hmmm...
$160K x 125/95 =
Gunderson to $210,526.31!!!1!!1!!11!
CLIENT-
b/c salary/bonus comparisons are relatively cut-and-dry. $160k > $145k, period. the fact that many "results" for clients are confidential (e.g., settlements, arbitrations), the whole thing is very subjective (who's to say that X trial victory is more impressive than Y merger?)...and besides, which more directly impacts an associate's daily life?
Hey Client, guess what? The blog you're posting on is primarily written for and read by law students and associates. Guess what they like to read, complain, and brag about? Their compensation.
"I've never once heard firms boast about the results they achieve for their clients in the same way they gloat over their compensation structure."
When you're not trolling legal gossip blogs, do you ever visit law firm websites? You might want to give it a try. Whereas compensation (if exact figures are even given) is buried within the "careers" section of a firm's site, the first thing one sees upon arriving at most firms' sites is a litany of client satisfaction awards, quotes, rankings, etc.
I for one think lock step makes sense. The people who truly suck will be fired. The ones who are truly excellent will get great work and eventually make partner. Everyone in between may have a shot at making partner, or may not, but they still contribute necessary work to the firm. I don't see why we need create different levels of associates within a class year early on by differentiating pay.
Plus, some people just get lucky early on in terms of the work they get and the partners with whom they work. Others get that experience later. It doesn't make sense to doubly reward the ones who happened to get on a great case, while punishing the ones who got stuck working on a crappy case or with a lousy partner.
Anyone who says, "I, for one, blah blah..." should be fired on the spot.
sorkin makes a solid overall point, though of course his analysis is deficient in many respects. bottom line, as obliquely hinted at in previous posts, is that the legal world presents a unique combination of both a highly leveraged firm structure and a lock-step compensation structure, which provide enough advantages to law students, current associates, and partners so as to keep the status quo working for a while longer.
the first firm, though, to dissolve its partnership, and start to run itself like a wall street firm (even possibly going public if the laws are changed here), will see a HUGE payoff. as the old norms and customs of the legal world continue dropping off (thanks for your help in this regard, Lat!) the clamor for structural change will grow within the partnership ranks even more quickly. as soon as the first UK firm goes public, mark my words.
11:28
or shot. either works.
I'd bet that you can tell me the compensation that any given firm pays its associates, but couldn't tell me one of their recent legal victories.
That's because (and I don't say this begrudgingly) lawyers are money-focused, not client-focused. That's not a bad thing. But there is a huge divide between the public image these firms try to present (client-focused) and their more private, money-driven aspirations (associate/partner pay).
I don't care what you make, quite honestly. I just wish you would all work your ass off and shut up about the compensation already. I've never seen a group of people more focused on pay than lawyers. Who gives a shit if your special bonus is $25,000 or 30,000? Does that difference matter? I can't help but wonder what drives the obsession, other than that it's a self-esteem issue.
10.23 -- who is andrew ross sorkin's father?
CLIENT-
that's b/c lawyers are focused on their own firm's clients, not clients of other firms. i can tell you about recent legal victories by my firm...why should i care about what firm X does? i don't give two hoots about their clients.
i probably know what firm X pays b/c:
1. compensation is generally uniform; therefore, it's not tough to remember which of a few "slots" a firm falls into.
2. it seems like a good idea to know my compensation sticks up relative to others who are presumably working as hard for their clients as i am for mine.
just b/c firm X pays more or less than firm Y doesn't make X any better or worse of a firm...perhaps a more/less attractive place to work, but that's it.
If you are "business" minded lawyer, it would seem that you go to highest paying law firm with least number of hours required. Linklaters, then, is for the smartest attorneys and business people. At Linklaters you get "Cravath Market" pay and bonus with nearly half the hours required.
STOP! hammer time!
and besides...ATL is a legal tabloid/gossip column. bonuses, salary, and salacious personnel gossip are much more appealing of a diversion from work than analyzing the ins and outs of Fish and Richarson's latest patent verdict, or CSM's most recent mega-deal.
it's entertainment, not some scientifically-designed barometer of attorney priorities.
I can't believe nobody addressed the fact that this is suppose to be a profession.
People complain all the time about how the profession aspect is dying and firms are turning into business machines. The compensation system is one of the last professional benefits left.
Equal pay makes a statement: we are all peers and merit the same respect. Implicit in this is that we are NOT suppose to be all about the money.
The comp system IS irrational in light of pure profit efficiency, so is pro bono, professional responsibility rules, and your mom.
I love how clients demand to see firm's pro bono efforts -- as if Citi bankers are out there planting trees and doing "pro bono".... ludicrous.
CLIENT:
Please keep posting. You are hilarious! Why would we believe you are a client, when you apparently think it's impossible to compare firms on any metric other than compensation? Do you have google where you are? You are aware that it is in the firm's interest to publicize its work, right?
The way this "profession" operates is backwards and outdated. The moronic compensation system is only one example. Everything from the way associates are hired to the the way they are promoted makes these firms inefficient. Just imagine how many of the nimrods who post on this blog are working at decent firms...
Lock-step associate salaries and bonuses make perfect sense. The revenue generated by each associate's work is dependent on just two factors: hours billed and their billable rate. Since the rate is determined by seniority and the hours billed generally stay the same (~2000/year), associate pay is lockstep based on seniority. QED.
I hate it and can't wait to get out of the law firm structure, but the economic logic isn't really questionable or dubious.
Um, 12:36, you should probably re-read what I posted. In fact, I asked why firms focus solely on the compensation as a way to differentiate between themselves (when in fact their salaries are all the same anyway). Why not look at other metrics, like the quality of the services they provide, not what they pay their employees?
If I have to spell it out for you, I wonder why there is little effort to rank firms in terms of their legal victories. So I'm not sure why you say "Why [do you] think it's impossible to compare firms on any metric other than compensation?" I never said that. Just the opposite, firms should compare themselves without just referring to salary.
Try re-reading what I wrote at 11:43.
11:12, you said:
"who's going to undertake the administrative task of assinging a value ot each associate? the only ones who are capable of making such judgments are partners (it's not as if th HR folks have any idea), and what partner wants to spend MORE time on admin tasks rather than on revenue-generation?
. . . unlike other businesses, time spent on law firm admin tasks detract from revenue generation, b/c many of the same people have to do both...the revenue generators are the managers as well, which is different from most other businesses."
Please explain how this is in fact any different from any other business. People in finance do not receive the same lockstep bonus (which is the majority of their salary). Do you think it's some HR person who's making the merit decisions there? Of course not -- it's "the revenue-generators."
What an idiotic column. Sorkin's analysis is correct if being an associate in a large, NY law firm is the only option in life for attorneys. The reason why Cravath, et al. raised their bonuses is:
A) they are competing with hedge funds, i-banks, other in-house or business opportunities for associates (especially mid-levels and seniors);
B) they are competing with other non-Biglaw legal options (such as move to the lower salary firm with better hours and better chance of partnership) (e.g., if Cravath was paying only $10k more than Firm X in Des Moines, and Firm X only required 1600 billables a year, where do you think many Cravath associates would go?); and
C) with the recent raises, Cravath *is* creating a stratified market (at some point, V50-V100 just will not be able to match).
Law firms at the top matching each other is really quite economical -- they can complete against outside (A, B & C) forces, but do not have to compete much amongst themselves as far as salaries go. Lock-stepping keeps salaries down, in my opinion.
12:30: Exactly.
1:03-
do people in finance bill by the hour? an hour of a lawyer's time spent dtermining whether associate smith shuld be paid $160,000 or $150,000 is an hour that could have been billed to a client, or an hour that could have been spent drumming up new business.
besides, in finance, your worth is more easily assessed than in law, where the more "talented" associates might not be the biggest billers. i'm just guessing here, but i suspect the most talented finance folks are also bringing in the most revenue. in a law firm, you just have to be willing to work more, which is not really a reflection of talent or ability.
and to be honest, i was thinking more along the lines of traditional businesses, with a dedicated supervisory and management structure. the engineers cranking out new upgrades for Lockheed's satellites aren't the ones managing budgets and doing performance reviews. subjectively assessing each engineer's worth or value does not take time away from the work that generates revenue.
The fact that all associates are paid the same amount, regardless of their different abilities, is a glaring economic inefficiency. After all, one associate is not *intrinsically* worth the exact same amount as the next associate (even though they may bill out at the same rate and even though clients may not object).
The only question is who bears the burden of this inefficiency. Is it the law firms, who could potentially bill their "star" associates at higher rates but don't? Or is it the client, who is forced to pay the standard associate rate without necessarily getting the best associate working on their case?
Of course, you can argue that the standard rate at which associates bill(say, $300/hour) represents the average value of all associates at a particular firm. But this still means that certain clients will get the benefit of a talented associate and pay 300/hour, while other clients are stuck with a less talented associate for the same 300/hour. In effect, individual clients might get either more than they paid for, or less, depending on the associate assigned to their case. The law firm, however, doesn't fall victim to this discrepancy because they have a wide range of associates, all of whom average out to be worth 300/hour.
I tend to think that these economical issues are marginal, and so law firms and clients don't really care to do anything about them. But it is interesting to see a field which is so corporate-driven nevertheless ignore a basic market principle, that salary and performance are inextricably linked.
if associates were paid differently, you would have to have partner x battling it out with partner y about whose associate is better (for fear that their associate will seek work from partner that can get better compensation for associates) - the battle would say more about the partners' relative worth than the associates'. Lockstep avoids this.
What fascinates me (and I'll be the first to admit that I'm easily distracted, and even more easily fascinated), is that I've read many quotes by many otherwise presumably intelligent lawyers, not ONE of whom has questioned the wisdom of being paid on a hourly basis, but even my plumber's apprentice, all of 19, and full of the hope of the future, has absolutely NO intention of being paid hourly, "when he becomes a true professional."
What is wrong with us? My doctor doesn't get paid by the hour. Nor my architect. Nor my dentist. Only my accountant (who punishes me double; he bores me blind, and charges me for the privilege, by the hour. . . .Ay!), and the lawyers I know (in ways both nice and most horrid). Oh, yeah, and some girls I met last weekend, but I don't want to talk about that right now.
Perhaps instead of worrying ourselves about an average hourly rate, and an average hourly bonus, and whether or not the guy or gal in the next cubicle down is more or less average than you are (they are, trust me. . .YOU are the smart one, the pretty one, we all like you best. . . .REALLY!), we should be asking why we're all crazy enough to accept hourly rates in the first place.
I mean, I KNOW we did that when we worked for McBurgerCorp at sixteen, but, you know, we didn't KNOW any better. Even those girls I met this this weekend don't work hourly. . . . they're smart enough to work by transaction; what is it with lawyers?
I get that accountants work per hour; so would you if your life revolved around T-accounts, ledgers, and reversing transactions. Puh-LEEZ. . .try this the next time you go out. . .walk up to the hottest person in the bar and say "reversing transaction." See if it helps you or hurts you. I'm just saying (this is more effective if you're hot to begin with, but it works no matter what).
I think we need to spend a little less time worrying about trading our lives in 2300 hour increments for a buck-fiddy and spend more time finding work that matters, and clients for whom it actually matters. And getting law firms to wise up. It probably won't happen. But it might.
What's really sad and ironic about all this ranting over pay structures in top tier firms is that only 15% of law grads actually make it to firms with over 250 lawyers. Which means most of the whining, greedy posters here will come out of law school making maybe $45-60,000. (If you can pass the bar). And your subsequent pay increases will certainly be merit-based.